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BOOK REVIEW
Economic Foundations of International Law. By Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes.
Cambridge MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2013. Pp. viii, 372. Index. $65.
Timothy Meyer
University of Georgia School of Law
Law has many goals: to express the values of a community, to change attitudes of
its subjects, to structure their interactions, and to give them a language in which those
interactions can occur. Law can legitimate particular conceptions of the general welfare
and therefore provide the field on which groups motivated by self-interest and altruism
alike compete for the attentions of others. Law can also define the obligations of the
members of a polity to each other and, by creating mechanisms to encourage compliance
with those obligations, change how its subjects behave.
For many years, international law scholarship focused on some of these goals, to
the exclusion of others. It paid relatively scant attention to how international law creates
incentives for self-interested states to behave in particular ways and to how those
incentives, in turn, structure the process of international lawmaking. The last ten years,
however, have seen a reversal in this trend. At present, economic analysis of international
law—an approach that assumes states rationally pursue their self-interest—is commonly
featured in many of the leading international law journals.1 In Economic Foundations of
International Law, Eric Posner, the Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of
Law at the University of Chicago School of Law, and Alan Sykes, the Robert A. Kindler
Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, provide what is, to date, the
capstone of the economic analysis of international law. The book’s objective is “to gather
together and build on many of the ideas” generated in the first decade or so of sustained
economic analysis of international law and “to present them in a manner suitable as an
introduction for students and as a reference work for scholars” (p. 3). The book seeks to
provide “an intellectual framework” for thinking about international law and therefore
“aims for breadth, not depth” (p. 4). The book is wildly successful in fulfilling these
goals. Economic Foundations is destined to be both a starting point for much future
research and a bridge between international legal scholars and political scientists working
in international relations, who have long embraced a rational choice approach.
The book is divided into five parts that proceed from the general to the specific.
Part I (chapters 1–3), entitled “Basics,” provides an overview of both international law
and the concepts needed for its economic analysis. Most significantly, chapter 3 offers a
succinct and accessible summary of the building blocks required to understand the
substantive chapters that follow. It makes clear the central assumption at the heart of
1
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economic analysis of the law, namely that “individuals act in their rational self-interest”
(p. 12). Quite appropriately, Posner and Sykes make little effort to defend this
methodological choice beyond acknowledging that it is a simplifying assumption.
Different methodologies are useful for answering different questions, and any
generalizable approach has to abstract away from detail to generate meaningful
predictions about how states will behave across a range of circumstances. The chapter
also introduces the concepts of externalities, public goods, and collective-action problems
and applies them to international law. In short, cross-border externalities create the
demand for international law. Put in noneconomic terms, actions taken in one state often
affect other states, but those cross-border effects are not reflected in the actor’s decisionmaking process. International law is one tool that states use to control such cross-border
externalities. Using international law for this task is complicated by the lack of a
centralized enforcement mechanism, but, as Posner and Sykes explain, the literature has
identified a number of decentralized mechanisms—including reputation, reciprocal
noncompliance, and retaliation—that create costs for breaching international law
obligations.
Part II (chapters 4–10), entitled “General Aspects of International Law,” develops
the economic analysis of the background institutions of international law. Thus, this part
has chapters on sovereignty and statehood (chapter 4), customary international law
(chapter 5), treaties (chapter 6), international institutions (chapter 7), state responsibility
(chapter 8), remedies (chapter 9), and the relationship between international and domestic
law (chapter 10). There is much to admire in the authors’ treatment of these subjects, and
much could be said about each. For the sake of brevity, I focus on the authors’ treatment
of international lawmaking, both customary international law and international law as
made by international institutions. In brief, Economic Foundations provides a very
valuable starting point for thinking about how the behavioral assumptions of economic
analysis explain patterns of international lawmaking. The authors do an excellent job of
detailing how and why states made (or did not make) different kinds of international law
throughout much of the twentieth century. At the same time, international lawmaking has
changed dramatically in recent decades. Economic analysis is a powerful tool to explain
these new patterns of lawmaking as well.
For example, the fate of customary international law as a category of legal norms,
currently being debated by the International Law Commission,2 is a key question facing
international law in the twenty-first century. Posner and Sykes offer a compelling account
of how customary international law emerges—through a common-law-like process of
resolving similar disputes among small numbers of states (often only two) in a similar
fashion. Consequently, prior disputes become precedents that states can use as bases to
resolve current disagreements.
2
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This account—which, in keeping with traditional international legal scholarship,
treats custom as qualitatively different from treaties—has a great deal of purchase in
describing how customary international law has historically emerged. One might wonder,
though, how different modern customary international law really is from treaty law in
terms of how the former develops and evolves. On the one hand, many international
treaties, including most multilateral agreements, are very vague, just as Posner and Sykes
note that customary international law can be. These vague treaty provisions are often
given content through the subsequent practice of states in applying the treaty provisions.
Indeed, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressly directs a treaty
interpreter to look at such state practice.3 On the other hand, since at least the middle of
the twentieth century, both treaties and international institutions have played major roles
in defining customary international law obligations. Treaties frequently codify, and
therefore help define, customary international law obligations, while resolutions passed
by the UN General Assembly or draft articles produced by the International Law
Commission are regularly cited as evidence of customary international law.4 These forms
of precedent differ fundamentally from the largely bilateral disputes described by Posner
and Sykes. While described as customary international law, such precedent is often the
product of multilateral negotiations and reflects a prospective declaration of what the law
is or should be, rather than a retrospective assessment of the existence of a general,
consistent state practice done out of a sense of legal obligation.5
Similarly, chapter 7 raises interesting questions about the lawmaking role of
international institutions. Posner and Sykes take the conventional view that international
institutions should be analyzed as delegations of authority from states. Such delegations
“can be legislative, executive, or judicial” (p. 80). The authors compare international
delegations with delegations of lawmaking authority from the U.S. Congress to
administrative agencies, but they argue that international delegations are exceedingly
rare. For example, the authors claim that legislative delegation—by which they seem to
mean the ability of an international institution to make binding law directly without any
intervening act, such as ratification, by states (p. 81)—is virtually nonexistent outside of
the UN Security Council and the institutions of the European Union. Similarly, Posner
and Sykes argue that “[j]udicial delegation at the international level is also extremely
rare,” (p. 81) although much of the chapter is spent describing the many international
courts and quasi-adjudicative committees that exist despite the lack of binding authority.
3
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Posner and Sykes’ central insight—that international institutions should be
analyzed differently depending on the functions that they perform—is of critical
significance. Scholarship on international organizations often does not sufficiently
distinguish among different kinds of international institutions. At the same time, a narrow
analytical framework that focuses on whether institutions may directly enact binding law
can unduly limit the potential for scholarly inquiry. International institutions vary
considerably in terms of their aims and how they function and thus, not surprisingly, in
how they are organized. The tools of economic analysis, including new institutional
economics, may fruitfully be applied to greatly expand our understanding of the variation
in how international institutions are structured, in how their internal governance
procedures operate, and in how they relate to each other.6
Take the example of international legislative bodies. Posner and Sykes are, of
course, correct that states empower few such bodies to enact binding law directly.7 A
slightly broader definition of a legislature reveals a very different picture, however. One
might define an international legislature as a body in which states make collective
decisions about the kinds of obligations, binding or not, that members of the group may
make. 8 This definition does not preclude an institution from being considered a
legislature merely because its acts must be individually ratified by states to be binding.
Rather, it focuses on whether state A has a legal right to participate in, and possibly
prevent, the formation of obligations by states B and C within a particular forum.
National legislatures function in this way, at least in part. For example, two U.S. states
may not make legal commitments to each other on their own. Instead, they must seek
either national legislation to deal with the issue or the permission of the U.S. Congress to
enter into a compact. 9 In either case, all other states, through their representatives in
Congress, have the chance to say yes or no to the proposed law, even if it does not affect
them.
Conceived of this way, there are dozens of international legislatures. The UN
Security Council and General Assembly, which Posner and Sykes discuss, are perhaps
the most obvious illustrations, but the conference of the parties (COP) to any multilateral
treaty would qualify: the COP to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
6
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Change, the Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC Statute), the COP to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
and the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to name only a
few. These institutions are organized like legislatures, often dividing their work into
committees and “adopting” legislative acts through either consensus or various voting
rules. The process of “adoption,” in which an international legislature approves an
instrument for possible ratification by its parties, is critical, even though it does not
directly result in binding legal obligations. 10 The process of adopting a draft legal
instrument permits dissenting member states to influence the obligations that
cooperation-minded member states make to each other. By refusing to permit a COP to
adopt a draft legal instrument, dissenters can prevent international lawmaking from
proceeding. Defining the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute illustrates the point.
Adopting the aggression amendments within the Assembly of the Parties, as was done at
Kampala in 2010, required consensus in practice. This voting rule meant that states
favoring a weaker definition of the crime of aggression were necessary if the aggression
amendments were to be adopted at all. These states were thus able to extract concessions
weakening the aggression amendments, despite the fact that some of these states likely
have no intention of ever ratifying the aggression amendments.11
Applying economic analysis to the internal organization and to the rules of these
international legislatures promises to advance considerably our explanations of modern
international lawmaking. The classic “delegation” paradigm that Posner and Sykes use as
their overarching model of international organizations does not adequately capture the
dynamics at work in international legislatures. International legislatures are not
delegations of the kind suggested by the comparison to the relationship between the U.S.
Congress and administrative agencies or courts. They also do not exist to reduce the
burden on lawmaking imposed by the requirement that states consent to their own legal
obligations.12 International legislatures usually retain the requirement that states consent
through ratification to their own binding legal commitments, while also adding an
additional requirement: that the legislature as a whole adopt the legal instrument before
any subset of member states may ratify it.
International legislatures are thus an alternative way of structuring interstate
negotiations. Legal obligations can be negotiated contractually, without institutional
structures and rules, as many bilateral treaties are negotiated. Alternatively, they can be
negotiated in legislative bodies, with permanent memberships and procedural rules.
10
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Organizing the negotiation of legal obligations through legislatures creates holdup
power.13 As with the Kampala negotiations, the legislature’s procedural rules give some
states veto power over the entire institution’s ability to act. A state (or a small group of
states)—including a state with no intention of ratifying the act of a COP—may thus
prevent cooperation-minded states from using existing international institutions to adopt
legal instruments among themselves.14
Using institutions to create additional holdup power is puzzling, given that
international lawmaking is already bedeviled by the requirement that states consent to
their own legal obligations. New institutional economics, however, suggests that this kind
of holdup power lubricates negotiations. It does so by making enforceable “vote-trading”
agreements in which states agree to make concessions to each other across issues not
under simultaneous negotiation. 15 For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership 16 (TPP)
consists of a variety of “chapters” negotiated sequentially. Each chapter could be adopted
as an individual treaty. Instead, the diplomatic conference negotiating the TPP will adopt
(or not adopt) the entire package as a single undertaking.17 This procedure means that a
state that makes concessions on the terms contained in one chapter with the expectation
of receiving concessions in a later-negotiated chapter can prevent the adoption of the
entire agreement if states do not honor the agreed-upon exchange of concessions. By
contrast, if states adopted chapters as they negotiated them, a state making a concession
in earlier chapters would have no assurances that the concessions that it expects to
receive in later chapters would actually materialize. States might be reluctant, therefore,
to make concessions in the first place.18 Adoption procedures and the holdup power that
they create thus actually reduce the transaction costs of iterative negotiations.
Having built out the framework for analyzing international law in general, part III
(“Traditional Public International Law” (chapters 11–15)), part IV (“The Environment”
(chapters 16–17)), and part V (“International Economic Law” (chapters 18–19)) analyze
substantive areas of international law. These three parts are especially valuable for the
13
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amount of ground that they cover and, true to the authors’ intent, provide an incredibly
useful reference for scholars interested in the economic analysis of a wide range of
international legal topics. The topics covered include the treatment of aliens, foreign
property, and foreign debt (chapter 11), the use of force (chapter 12), the conduct of war
(chapter 13), human rights (chapter 14), international criminal law (chapters 15),
international environmental law (chapter 16), the law of the sea (chapter 17),
international trade (chapter 18), and international investment law (chapter 19). In each
chapter, the authors identify the core economic rationale for the law or the economic
puzzle in the law, and they also critique the law where it does not seem justifiable on
economic grounds.
Chapter 14 on human rights provides an illustrative example. As Posner and
Sykes describe the conundrum, in most areas of international law a “treaty sets out a quid
pro quo—each party incurs an obligation that benefits the other party . . . . Human rights
treaties do not seem to fit this model” (p. 202). Instead, Posner and Sykes argue that, in
entering into human rights treaties, “Western liberal states that set the agenda believed
that they would not have to change their behavior. In their view, they already respected
human rights. The idea of the treaty regime was to compel other states . . . to do the
same” (id.). The puzzle, in the authors’ view, is why other states agreed, given that liberal
democracies were not offering any concessions in the agreement itself.
Posner and Sykes present a creative explanation of this puzzle. States with
troubling human rights practices join and comply (when they do) with human rights
treaties in exchange for side payments of various kinds, as a signaling device to foreign
and domestic constituencies and as a means to avoid sanctions from liberal democracies.
But the real value in human rights treaties, Posner and Sykes argue, is that they solve a
collective action problem among liberal democracies. Poor human rights practices in
other countries create a kind of externality in the sense that liberal democracies suffer
disutility from poor human rights practices in other countries. Improving human rights
practices is thus “a ‘good’ for which they have preferences (for which they are willing to
pay)” (p. 203). Moreover, liberal democracies are likely to have overlapping preferences
for good human rights practices; the United States and European nations all prefer, for
example, that genocide not occur. These overlapping preferences create a collective
action problem. Although each state would like to encourage human rights violators to
improve their practices, it fails to internalize the entire benefit of its efforts. Therefore, it
will attempt to “free ride” on the efforts of other countries to improve human rights
practices, generating inefficiently low sanctions for human rights violators. Human rights
treaties arguably help solve this problem by coordinating sanctioning efforts among
liberal democracies. To the extent that this coordination is ineffective, it may be because
“liberal countries rarely have a strong interest in improving well-being in other countries”
(p. 206), rather than because the mechanism itself does not work.
This explanation has the great virtue of explaining why human rights treaties may
not be that different from many other kinds of international agreements. The United
States, for instance, has long used international law to export U.S. regulatory regimes in
fields other than human rights. The Montreal Protocol, which followed domestic U.S.
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regulation of ozone-depleting substances, and the anticorruption conventions of the
United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
which followed the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,19 are two prominent
examples where the United States regulated a problem domestically first and then pushed
for an international agreement. In both cases, the United States accepted few new
obligations in the corresponding international agreements, precisely because these
agreements were based on U.S. domestic standards. Other countries still joined, however,
perhaps in part because of how the international treaties coordinated sanctions.20
Other chapters in parts III, IV, and V of the book highlight situations where
economic analysis has already made significant inroads into international law and where
it holds promise for considerably greater gains. Part V, on international economic law, is
the most detailed section, comprising two chapters and sixty-six pages. This length
reflects the fact that international economic law is the field in which economic analysis of
international law began and in which it has its greatest synergies. In contrast, chapter 16
on international environmental law is a brief eight pages. Although some very excellent
economic analyses of international environmental law exist,21 the brevity of this chapter
underscores the opportunities available for future economic analysis. For example, many
international environmental regimes contain trade rules aimed at reducing trade-based
environmental externalities. These regimes—the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species, the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent, the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, to name only a
few—are susceptible to economic analysis in a fashion similar to trade and investment
law.
No single review can do justice to the breadth of material and ideas covered in
Economic Foundations of International Law. The book should be required reading for the
serious scholar of international law, whether or not engaging in economic analysis. In a
book with such a wide scope, no doubt any reader will find something with which to
disagree. But such disagreements should not take away from Posner and Sykes’s
achievement. Economic Foundations consolidates the gains and insights made in the
economic analysis of international law to date and sets the stage moving forward.
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